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Confronting Anti-Urban Marketing Stereotypes: A Milwaukee Economic
Development Challenge
by Lois M. Quinn and John Pawasarat, Employment and Training Institute, School of Continuing Education, University of
Wisconsin~ Milwaukee, June 2001.

Working with the Helen Bader Foundation and the Milwaukee Department of City Development, the Employment
and Training Institute has developed purchasing power profiles for Milwaukee neighborhoods and commercial
districts. The profiles are posted on the City of Milwaukee website at www.mkedcd.org/PurchasingPower. These
profiles utilize current state income tax records, local property files, business phone listings, state driver's license
files, motor vehicle records, and state and federal mortgage lending databases to identifY the purchasing power that
comes from urban population densities and concentrations of income and to describe economic trends of interest to
retailers and other commercial businesses. As part of the project, ETI examined the information reports and
stereotypes about Milwaukee neighborhoods presented by national and international marketing firms. This paper
examines the methodologies firms use to develop marketing information on Milwankee neighborhoods, traces the
history of marketing clustering systems, and explores the damage marketing stereotypes pose for Milwankee and
other cities. See also, the Brookings Institution discussion paper on "Exposing Urban Legends: The Real
Purchasing Power of Central Citv Neighborhoods."
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Findings
I. Marketing firms frequently use racial and class-based stereotypes to describe urban neighborhoods. On
its website CACI, an international data firm, stated that African Americas in Milwaukee "splurge on fast
food and spend leisure time going to bars and dancing." Milwaukee Hispanics, CACI stated, "splurge on
videos, long-distance phone calls, cable TV, and theme parks and casino visits." Claritas, Inc., another
international data company, reported on its website that a fourth of residents on the near southside of
Milwaukee (in zipcode 53204) "smoke 9 or more cigarette packs per week ... [and] don't know the amount
of money needed to retire comfortably." Claritas described the residents of northside African American
neighborhoods in Milwaukee as "very low income families [who] buy video games, dine at fast food
chicken restaurants, [and] use non-prescription cough syrup." Meanwhile, according to Claritas, North
Shore suburbanites are "interested in civic activities, volunteer work, contributions and travel." A review of
zipcode profiles for other cities uncovered identical descriptions used to characterize hundreds of urban
neighborhoods around the country.

2. In order to produce data reports at low expense, most marketing firms rely primarily upon decennial
census data and broad assumptions about "types" of households. Ignoring state and local databases,
CACI denigrated four Milwaukee zipcode areas (53205, 53206, 53208, and 53212) as "distressed
neighborhoods" where people "who work have only part-time jobs." Yet, working age tax filers in these
zipcodes reported adjusted gross income totaling $804 million in 1999. Working age filers reported $37
million income per square mile in zipcode 53205, $67 million per square mile in zipcode 53206, $75
million income per square mile in zipcode 53208, and $55 million per square mile in zipcode 53212. Oak
Creek residents, whom CACI described on its website as "a prosperous population who have opted for
semirurallocales and lifestyles," had just $20 million adjusted gross income per square mile in 1999.
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3. When retail spending patterns are estimated based on detailed income tax data, the purchasing power of
the central city is very high -- given the high concentrations of workers and data showing that
lower-income households spend a greater portion of their income on retail expenditures than
higher-income households. The data show that Milwaukee residents in the four zipcodes described as
"distressed" by CACI spend an estimated $373 million annually for retail purchases for food, apparel,
entertainment, household furnishings and equipment, and personal care products and services. These
central city residents are spending $22 to $3 8 million per square mile on retail expenditures -- well
above the estimated $4.5 million spent in Franklin and $17.4 million spent in Greendale, for example.
Estimated Annual Retail Spending Per Square Mile
"Distressed Neighborhoods" [CACI]
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4. Rather than comparing purchasing power per square mile, marketing companies usually rank
neighborhoods based primarily on race and class. Sparsely populated suburban areas with high
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average household income are rated as "winners" while densely populated urban areas witb higber
concentrations of income are ranked as "losers." These rankings are tben used to steer businesses toward
upper income neighborhoods while writing off urban centers. In a research report for the National Retail
Hardware Association, Claritas encouraged home improvement store owners throughout the country to
target suburban neighborhoods while ignoring urban centers. ETI estimates tbat eigbt central city
Milwaukee neighborhoods in the categories written off by Claritas spend over $93 million annually for
household furnishings and equipment. These "non-targeted" central city neigbborhoods spend an
estimated $3.7 million per square mile each year for household furnishings and equipment while seven
Milwaukee County suburban areas with Claritas categories identified as important markets for store
expansions spend one-third tbat -- $1.2 million per square mile.
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5. In order to produce reports tbat can be easily and inexpensively replicated for every possible
neighborhood in the United States, local statistics are often ignored even when they directly
measure the trend under analysis and when tbe data are readily available. CAP Index, Inc., a leading
seller of crime data, estimates "crime risk" based on a statistical model that links national crime statistics
to decennial census data on the types of people living in neighborhoods where crime often occurs. The
company reported tbat tbe "risk" of murder, rape or robbery at Miller Park is 3 to 4 times the national
average-- based on its statistical analysis of census data for people living in a 12-square mile area
around the ballpark. Under this formula, every baseball stadium in tbe country is considered an unsafe
area, except the ballpark in Arlington, Texas (home oftbe Texas Rangers). CAP Index, Inc., rates tbe
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee campus as having "risk" of violent crime at five to nine times tbe
national average, not because of reported crime around UWM, but because there are census tracts witb
large numbers of poor people living within five miles of the school.
6. To minimize costs and maximize production of data, national marketing firms even "adjust" local
data to fit their uatioual statistical models and computer programming needs. For example,
Claritas, Inc., secured data from tbe Milwaukee Department of City Development showing a 3 percent
decline in housing units in the census tracts around zipcode 53204, yet reported a 9 percent decline. The
firm reported tbat the area had 36 percent fewer owner-occupied housing units than the City of
Milwaukee property file showed, 29 percent fewer vehicles tban the number registered witb the state
Department of Transportation, and 16 percent fewer working families tban tbe number of working age
single and married income tax filers with dependents. Using its statistical model (and ignoring local
school, healtb department and tax revenue records suggesting growtb), Claritas projected a I 0 percent
decline in population over the decade while the population actually showed a 5 percent increase.
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7. Most marketing companies do not reveal the sources of their data or when the data were last
updated. Because commercial marketing information is readily available (although often at exorbitant
prices), some government departments and community agencies have also relied on such data,
hampering their own ability to sell their neighborhoods.
Computer-Generated Stereotypes Hinder Economic Development
Early ETI reviews of commercial marketing firm reports focused on two neighborhoods - -Mitchell Street on
the southside and Fond duLac and North avenues on the northside. At the request of the Helen Bader
Foundation, the Employment and Training Institute prepared a purchasing power profile for the neighborhood
around Fond duLac and North for a national site selection team from Kmart. The site is at the center of one of
Milwaukee's most densely populated neighborhoods, with a growing labor force, rising incomes and available
workers. A suitable 14.7-acre tract of vacant land was available on two heavily-traveled arterials and served by
three bus routes. The site had much to recommend it -- except for its perceived reputation as an inner city area.
An urban neighborhood like this, which could potentially benefit from the 300 jobs and modestly-priced retail
goods a Super Kmart might bring, is plagued by deficit-based marketing stereotypes and urban legends that
lead companies to avoid the central city.
Consider the description of this neighborhood offered by CACI Marketing Systems, an international firm
headquartered in London, England. CACI described the neighborhood as "distressed" and "characterized by
youth, single parenthood, poverty, high unemployment, and public assistance." Its residents, CACI armounced
on its website, "splurge on fast food and spend leisure time going to bars and dancing." "Unemployment is
high," CACI reported, "those who do work have only part-time jobs. "(1) A similarly negative portrait was
provided by Claritas, Inc., a subsidiary ofVNU Marketing Information Services, a Netherlands- based media
conglomerate. Claritas labeled the neighborhood "Difficult Times" where residents "buy video games, dine at
fast food chicken restaurants, [and] use non-prescription cough syrup." Another Claritas marketing scheme
labeled the area as a combination of "Inner Cities" (a type it ranked 47th in desirability), "Single City Blues"
(ranked 45th) and "Mid-City Mix" (ranked 30th).(2)
If the Kmart team were to consider locating in the nearby suburb of Oak Creek, they would learn from CACI
Marketing Systems that the residents there are "a prosperous population who have opted for semirurallocales
and lifestyles." As for leisure time activities, CACI reported: "As homebodies, they are interested in reading,
needlework, and cooking." Claritas offered a similarly positive description of Oak Creek: supposedly 33.81%
of residents are a "Family Ties" population who "eat at fast food pizza restaurants, shop at Builder's Square,
and own a bowling ball," while 33.77% fall in the "Great Beginnings" category, meaning residents who "dine
at fast food Asian and Mexican restaurants, shop at 7-Eleven, and lease their car," and 17.82% are in the
"White Picket Fence" grouping, where residents "play softball [and] eat at Dairy Queen."
It would appear from the Internet that a host of international marketing firms have traveled to Milwaukee's
central city and surveyed neighborhood residents, but no such visits have occurred. A review of neighborhoods
around the country from Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago to Scottsdale, Arizona --uncovered identical
descriptions (and dozens like them) used to characterize hundreds of urban neighborhoods around the country.
When the methodology used to create these "market segments" was examined in detail, it was discovered that
most of the marketing statistics and stereotypes are based on ten-year-old census data and broad assumptions
about purchasing habits of minorities and urban residents. Average household income was used as the primary
factor in rating neighborhoods while income density was ignored.
For example, 1999 state income tax returns showed that the residents in the Fond duLac and North area
(zipcode 53206) had 10,166 working age single and married tax filers, or 3,737 filers per square mile. This is
one of the highest concentrations of working age income tax filers in the Milwaukee area. By contrast, Oak
Creek had 405 tax filers per square mile. Working age families and single persons in zipcode 53206 reported
$183 million in total adjusted gross income in 1999, or $67.3 million per square mile, a concentration of
income more than three times that earned by "prosperous" Oak Creek residents-- $20 million. When the 1999
adjusted gross income of Wisconsin tax filers was examined for the four zipcode areas that CACI Marketing
Systems describes as "distressed" where employment is supposedly only part-time, the income totaled $804
4

million. Income earned in 1999 per square mile in these neighborhoods ranged from $36.9 to $75.1 million
well above that of Oak Creek and Franklin and comparable to other suburban neighborhoods.
Research by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) finds that lower-income
families spend far more of their income on retail purchases than higher income earners. Using detailed income
tax data from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue by neighborhood and block area, ETI estimated the
purchasing power of zipcodes and blocks in Milwaukee County based on patterns of spending fonnd by the
CEX for large cities in the Midwest by income range and family composition. The model for this work was
developed by Frank Stetzer and John Pawasarat of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee after a review of
five quarters of CEX data, state income tax data and HCFA (Health Care Financing Act) files on the elderly
population. The data showed that residents in zipcodes 53205, 53206, 53208 and 53212 armually spend over
$3 73 million for retail purchases. These central city residents are spending about $29 million per square mile
on retail expenditures.
When purchasing power per square mile is examined for the Milwaukee area, it becomes immediately apparent
that central city neighborhoods show high concentrations of annual income and offer important economic
opportunities for retailers. These opportunities have yet to be realized by many national marketing firms. By
ignoring the income density of the nation's cities and focusing their neighborhood rankings on average
household income, marketing firms mislead retailers and other businesses into thinking that central city
neighborhoods are a "distressed" market where business is unprofitable. A case in point is the work performed
by Claritas, Inc. for the National Retail Hardware Association described below.
Steering Business From the Central City
In the last three decades a host of national and international marketing companies have created neighborhood
descriptions based on cluster analysis of census tracts, zipcodes, block groups and ZIP+4 areas. Typically, the
population of the entire United States is segmented into 40-60 groupings (see detailed discussion below) which
are then grouped and/or ranked according to their market potential. For example, Claritas, Inc. used its 50
"MicroVision" clusters (which included the "Difficult Times," "Great Beginnings," "Family Ties," and "White
Picket Fences" descriptions cited above) to advise the National Retail Hardware Association on where its
members should locate and expand their businesses. Based on the Claritas research, home improvement center
owners throughout the country are encouraged to target suburban neighborhoods while ignoring urban centers.
Fourteen market segments were identified by Claritas as "suburban" and all fourteen were recommended as
good business prospects. Meanwhile, only 2 of the 18 market segments identified as "urban" or
"urban/suburban" were recommended as neighborhoods to target for home improvement retail business.
The Claritas rationale for its recommendations was explained in a marketing article on the NRHA website:
"The reason for identifying these marketing targets is based on two tried and true observations. First, the best
customers are existing customers. The people who are already shopping these stores or other people similar to
existing customers are most likely the best customers. Secondly, birds of a feather flock together. In choosing a
place to live, people tend to seek out neighborhoods compatible with their lifestyles .... By identifying the types
of neighborhoods in which they find existing independent stores' shoppers, researchers can accurately predict
the types of neighborhoods where the industry can find future customers."(3)
Again, the data on Milwaukee neighborhoods call these marketing assumptions into question. The estimated
purchasing power for the CEX category of household furnishings and equipment was calculated for each
Milwaukee neighborhood based on 1999 income tax data and other current files on the population. In the
central city Milwaukee neighborhoods given category labels dismissed by Claritas as low-priority markets for
home improvement stores, spending for household furnishings and equipment ranged from $1.6 million (in
zipcode 53233) to $5.6 million per square mile (in zipcode 53210). In suburban neighborhoods with types
recommended by Claritas as prime customer areas for home improvement sales, spending for these categories
ranged from $0.6 million per square mile in Franklin to $3 million per square mile in South Milwaukee.
"Discrimination in the Digital Age"
Milwaukee is not alone in feeling the effects of marketing stereotypes that inaccurately describe urban
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communities. In June 2000, the Acorn Housiug Corporation announced a lawsuit against the Wells Fargo
Bank for linkiug Internet users exploring housing moves to websites with racial stereotypes designed by CACI.
The housing group objected to the description of iuner city and African American neighborhoods as
"distressed" and to such quotes as, "They splurge on fast-food and chicken restaurant take-out. They listen to
urban contemporary music and read Playboy magazine." Accordiug to Mike Shay, executive director of the
advocacy agency, the Wells Fargo website "brought the old discrimiuatory practices of block-busting and
racial steering into the digital age." Shay explained, "If you were moviug from one city to another they'd ask
what zip code you currently lived iu, and then they'd refer you only to similar zip codes with similar racial
characteristics in the new city."(4) In an immediate response, Wells Fargo dropped the website link to the
CACI data. The lawsuit is ongoiug.
In Richmond, Virginia, a jury returned a $100.5 million verdict against Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, a decision based in part on the iusurance company's use of marketing strategies to rank each zipcode
iu the metropolitan area accordiug to its Claritas "MicroVision" category. Agents were encouraged to target
zipcodes with more desirable "MicroVision" rankings. All of the City of Richmond zipcodes which were
predomiuantly minority were excluded from the list of targeted areas. In a divided opiuion, the decision was
overturned on appeal on the grounds that the fair housiug organization briugiug the suit, Housiug
Opportunities Made Equal of Richmond, lacked standiug under Virgiuia law.(5)
The two marketiug firms whose clustering plans were the basis for the housiug lawsuits (Claritas and CACI)
now team up with non-profit organizations to sell special "iuner city" databases and analyses to promote urban
communities; at the same time these firms' websites and client reports contiuue to denigrate central city
neighborhoods. The housing lawsuits may represent the tip of the iceberg as cities identifY the negative
impacts of marketing stereotypes commonly provided to Fortune 500 companies, local entrepreneurs and
Internet surfers by international marketing companies. For cities like Milwaukee, the negative marketiug
stereotypes associated with city neighborhoods amount to computer-generated "urban legends" that have to be
overcome iu order to attract new busiuesses. The scientific nature of the statistics presented lead credibility to
the reports, even when these statistics are contradicted by local, more accurate data, as seen in the example
below.
A "Weighted Statistical Average": Crime Risk, Crime Reality
The most popular crime iudices use a demographic-based model which estimates crime risk based on the kiuds
of people who reside iu neighborhoods where crime is often committed rather than usiug current data on where
crimes actually occur. Data companies use national statistics from the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, the
decennial census population reports and other sources, iu order to make broad generalizations about the type of
people who are more likely to live iu areas with certain types of crimes. Once this crime "risk index" is
developed for the country, the crimes reported nationally (or in some cases by metropolitan area) are then
"reallocated" to each neighborhood based on the characteristics of its residents. New crime iudices are issued
each year even though the demographic characteristics of the neighborhood population may be ten or more
years old.
Using this methodology, the APB News website reports that the risk of homicide, rape or robbery around
Milwaukee County Stadium (now Miller Park) is 3 to 4 times the national average. In this case, the crime risk
is based on the CAP Index statistical model applied to the 1990 demographic characteristics of residents living
withiu a 12-square mile circle around the stadium. Given the methodology used, it is not surprising that
twenty-seven major league baseball stadiums in the U.S. are designated as iu high crime risk areas. Accordiug
to the CAP Index, only the Texas Rangers play iu a "safe" area Arlington, Texas. Indeed, almost any place
urban will show up as dangerous, irrespective of the actual crimes that occur agaiust college students or
baseball fans.(6)
The CAP Index, the leadiug provider of these risk numbers, goes so far as to claim, "Police Reports and the
FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) are useful compliments to CAP Index scores, but are not thorough enough
by themselves."(7) Local residents are admonished, "If your risk surprises you, keep in mind this is a weighted
statistical average for the entire ZIP code. "(8) Samples of crime risk maps displayed on the Internet typically
portray hundreds of square miles of city neighborhoods as dangerous places. Parents loggiug onto the Internet
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are told, for example, that the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee is in a "high risk" crime area. The CAP
Index rates the UWM campus as having "risk" of violent crime at five to nine times the national average, not
because of reported crime around the campus but because there are census tracts with large numbers of poor
people living within five miles of the school.(9)
The level of neighborhood specificity helps give these crime indices their believability --to parents debating
whether to allow their high school graduate to attend an urban university or to a business executive considering
locating a retail operation in a highly populated neighborhood. Yet they are far from accurate. To test the
accuracy of crime information offered by marketers for Milwaukee neighborhoods, the Employment and
Training Institute reviewed Milwaukee police department reports and selected 22 census tracts with the same
number of violent crimes (murders, rapes and robberies) in 1998. The CAP Index ranked six of these tracts as
"low risk" for violent crimes (i.e., less than one-half of the national average), seven tracts as "moderate risk" (at
the national average), eight tracts as "moderately high risk" (two to four times the national average) and one
tract as "high risk" (five to nine times the national average). Thus, the maps of these neighborhoods on the
APB News website shaded some census tracts in red for "dangerous," some in yellow for "caution," and some
in green for "safe." The maps suggested the risk of violent crime was up to 18 times higher in some tracts than
in others. In fact, the true crime level, as measured by official police statistics on violent crimes committed,
was the same in all 22 census tracts.
Selling crime vulnerability statistics (and giving away even worse data) has become a thriving Internet activity
particularly on websites advertising security systems, car locks and homeowners insurance. The impact of
these "statistics" in scaring away potential businesses, homeowners and other development is impossible to
estimate but it could hardly be a positive one. Other data about urban areas are equally suspect, as seen in the
case study below.

"Complex Methodology": Portraying Stable Neighborhoods As in Decline
While preparing a purchasing power profile report for zipcode 53204 on the near southside, ETI compared the
data it had amassed for the Milwaukee Neighborhood Indicators Project with reports offered by commercial
firms. The demand for annually updated, geographically detailed demographic estimates by neighborhood has
resulted in the proliferation of marketing databases. Nearly all marketing firms construct their current estimates
based on 1990 demographic data from the decennial census updated from an impressive array of public and
private data sources. These sources are usually fed into a formula to estimate the current and projected
demographic and purchasing patterns but in some cases these databases have serious limitations that impact
negatively on measures of neighborhood well-being.
An exhaustive examination of data sources revealed a number of commercially developed sources that were in
serious conflict with local institutional sources of data for zipcode 53204. One very popular commercial source
of recent, detailed demographic data was Claritas, which for $99 offered a 12-page demographic report with
1999 data and projections for 2004 as well. The Claritas data, however, portrayed 53204 as a neighborhood
with declining population, home ownership, housing units, vehicles and working families. For example, while
Claritas secured tract level data from the Milwaukee Department of City Development, which showed a 3
percent decline in housing units from 1990 to 1999, the firm "adjusted" the data to report a 9 percent decline in
housing units-- triple the city counted loss. The firm also reported that the area had 36 percent fewer
owner-occupied housing units than the City of Milwaukee property file showed.
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation file showed 14,135 registered vehicles but Claritas reported
I 0,141, or 29 percent fewer vehicles. The state's motor vehicle file showed that 10,303 households had valid
license plates for their vehicles, but Claritas estimated that 6,998 households had vehicles, or 32 percent fewer.
A total of 6, 756 working age single and married tax filers with dependents submitted income tax returns to the
state Department of Revenue in 1998, but Claritas reported only 5,703 working families, or 16 percent fewer.
Claritas reported a 10.1 percent decline in population, from 40,530 in the 1990 Census to 36,430 in 1999, and
projected a further decline to 34,643 by 2004. CACI Marketing Systems estimated an even larger decrease of
10.9 percent over the nine-year period, with the 1999 population estimated at 36, I 02. Yet, ahnost all sources
of data assembled by ETI showed a stable neighborhood with indicators pointing in a positive direction over
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time. Births had remained stable, with I ,026 in 1993 and I ,031 in 1998. The school census showed a 4 percent
increase in the school age population. State income tax filings showed a 6.3 percent increase in working age
tax filers from 1993 to 1998 and a 22 percent increase in adjusted gross income. When questioned about the
serious discrepancies in their population data for 53204, researchers at Claritas responded that they had
rechecked their sources and methodology. They explained that they utilize "a complex methodology that uses
post-1990 inputs (Donnelley) to create accurate block group estimates." They stated further that "Every source
of data that we have shows this ZIP code as declining."(lO) The 2000 Census data confirmed the observations
of residents and local data findings: the 2000 Census population count totaled 42,747, a 5.5 percent increase
over 1990.
Puzzled why a marketing firm would alter current administrative databases (like the city property file and the
state department of transportation motor vehicle files), ETI began examining the statistical models used to
drive the generation of city statistics by the marketing firms. Ensuing discussions with Claritas revealed that
many of the sources used by Claritas/Donnelley were federal, state and local databases commonly accessed by
marketing firms: city housing units at the tract level, state department of transportation vehicle files, and files
from the United State Postal Service, U.S. Census, Internal Revenue Service, and the Health Care Financing
Administration. ETI purchased or obtained these data files and then compared them to the Claritas estimates.
The institutional data sources provided by federal, state and city agencies were compared to the results of the
"complex methodology" used in the 1999 demographic and housing statistics for 53204. In reviewing
methodologies used by Claritas and other marketing firms to adjust local and state administrative databases
with zipcode data, Employment and Training Institute researchers identified several critical areas where the
population and economic assets of urban neighborhoods are often undercounted.
A primary factor in explaining the discrepancies in data produced by marketing firms is their heavy reliance
placed on historically under counted U.S. census data. Many firms compound urban undercount problems by
utilizing other databases which are often less accurate in urban areas. For example, monthly statistics on active
U.S. Postal Service delivery route addresses and postal boxes are often used to "update" census counts, but
postal workers warn that these counts are not intended for this purpose and tend to be less accurate in city
neighborhoods with high residential mobility and several families sharing the same postal address. The Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) count of the Medicare population is another valuable national
database, but it must be used with caution in neighborhoods with large numbers of immigrants and other
elderly persons not eligible for Medicare. Also, telephone counts are frequently usecl as population trend
factors, yet a lower percentage of low-income households have listed phones and many may use cell phones if
they have poor credit history. Likewise, driver's license tiles, while valuable data sources, should be used with
caution in states like Wisconsin where license suspensions are used as a method of collecting unpaid fmes and
civil forfeitures unrelated to driving. Other limitations of generating neighborhood reports by computer (one
researcher called it"as easy as printing money") become evident once the history of Cluster marketing is
understood.
History of Cluster Marketing: "You Are Where You Live"
The methodology used to warn retailers, college applicants and even baseball fans away from central city
neighborhoods had its ironic genesis in research funded by the U.S. Office on Economic Opportunity, as part
of the War on Poverty. In 1966 the OEO funded Jonathan Robbin, a developer of multivariate computer
software for the IBM 360 and former sociology professor at New York University, to prepare descriptions of
the demographic and economic characteristics of U.S. counties utilizing 1960 census files and other federal
statistical data. Robbin developed indices to compare areas of need across the country including a "Poverty
Index" and an "Index of Susceptibility to Civil Disorder" that was used by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development to select cities for "Model Cities" anti-riot funds.(ll)
Robbin saw the potential for analyses of decennial census data at the zipcode level to help identifY desirable
markets for mass mailings and advertising firms. Robbin's oft-stated premise for the neighborhood clusters he
created was simple "Birds of a feather flock together." Michael Weiss, who has written three books promoting
the Clari.tas clustering model, quoted Robbin's philosophy: "Basically, people seek out neighborhoods that are
most congenial to them.· At each stage in their life cycle, people tend to join their peers in appropriate
communities, whether it's in high-rise city apartments or single homes out in suburbia."(12) The 36,000 U.S.
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Postal Service zipcodes, initiated in 1963, proved an ideal geographic area for Robbin's clusters. By linking his
cluster groupings with consumer files and client mailing addresses, Robbin could identity new zipcode markets
for products and target consumers for direct mail and retailing efforts.
Robbin founded a marketing firm, Claritas, to sell his databases to business and government clients. Initially,
Claritas created 40 PRIZM (Potential Ratings in ZIP Markets) clusters using 1970 U.S. Census data. This
approach provided a model for numerous competitive systems that have evolved since 1974. Once the clusters
were created, each zipcode, census tract and census block group was assigned to one of these categories. The
clusters were ranked from most to least prosperous, and given catchy titles to convey their market potential or
lack of it. The result was to effectively divide up the nation's total market into clusters of winners and losers.
After the 1980 census, Claritas' cluster groupings were modified slightly, with some renamed and others added
or subtracted. The market winners in the 1980s groupings began with "Blue Blood Estates" ("America's
wealthiest neighborhoods suburban homes and one in ten millionaires"), "Money & Brains" ("posh big-city
enclaves of townhouses, condos and apartments"), "Furs & Station Wagons" ("new money in metropolitan
bedroom suburbs"), and "Urban Gold Coast" ("upscale urban high-rise districts"). The last of the forty clusters
were the losers: "Share Croppers" ("primarily southern hamlets devoted to farming and light industry"),
"Downtown Dixie Style" ("aging, predominantly black neighborhoods, typically in southern cities"), "Hispanic
Mix" ("America's Hispanic barrios"), "Tobacco Road" ("predominantly black farm communities throughout
the South"), "Hard Scrabble" ("the nation's poorest rural settlements"), and the neighborhoods ranked at the
very bottom, "Public Assistance" ("America's inner-city ghettos").(13)
While Robbin spoke of reviewing over six hundred variables and millions of market records, three variables
appear to be critical to his model: PLACE (big city, suburban community, small town, or rural), RACE (white,
black, Hispanic, older white immigrant or young recent immigrant), and INCOME.(14) Claritas now offers 62
PRIZM rankings based on groupings which include some age and family type variables derived from the 1990
census in addition to place, race and income to help identity popular markets for retirees, empty nesters and
young professionals. The cluster stereotypes are also now applied to the twenty-two million ZIP+4 delivery
areas (i.e., smaller geographic units that typically include several blocks, a group of streets, an apartment
building or small geographic areas within each zipcode). The basic division of the American marketplace into
the most attractive and least attractive residents is retained: "Blue Blood Estates" remains at the top of the
cluster rankings; the three bottom groups are "Hispanic Mix" ("urban Hispanic singles and families") "Inner
Cities" ("inner-city solo-parent families") and "Southside City" ("African American service workers").(15)
After Robbin had divided the nation's zipcodes into PRIZM clusters, he began collecting customer databases
and client address lists to determine which clusters had households more apt to buy specific types of products
and services. Thus, the residents of "Inner Cities," according to a Claritas website, are most likely to "buy baby
food, buy soullr&b/black music, pay bills by phone, watch pay-per-view sports, read the National Enquirer."
By contrast, "Old Yankee Rows" residents ("Empty-Nest, Middle-Class Families") are most likely to "belong
to a union, believe ad campaigns, buy pop music, watch bowling, and read Spin."
Even in their crude state, these marketing generalizations proved to have utility for Claritas's customers. As
Weiss pointed out, a direct mailing campaign would be considered phenomenally successful if it raised the
customer response rate from two percent to three percent, even though 97 percent of those targeted did not
respond.(16) One Claritas website concedes that PRIZM "is not intended to predict with absolute certainty
how every neighborhood's household lives or what they buy or don't buy, rather it is used to predict the
likelihood that a certain type of behavior or purchasing preference drink diet soda or go skiing, for instance
would be found in higher concentrations within that neighborhood versus another."(17)
Other marketing firms copied the Claritas approach. The CACI Marketing Systems produced 42 unique
neighborhood clusters from "Top One Percent" to "Distressed Neighborhoods." Internet surfers are told that
"Top One Percent" residents typically "drive luxury cars and visit museums" and are interested in "civic
activities, volunteer work, contributions, and travel" while "Urban Hispanics" a group that is far down on the
list of clusters "read religious books" in their leisure time.(lS)
The Claritas "MicroVision" scheme presents a softer image with more subtle negative stereotypes. The "Close
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Knit Families" webpage (MicroVision Segment 41) shows a smiling Hispanic family; the population is
described as "low income young adults, age 18-34, with a large number of children, seven or more people."
They "dine at midscale Mexican restaurants, attend movies 2-3 times a month, purchase doll toys, and had
transmission service done in the last year." An African American family with three children is pictured for
"City Ties" (Micro Vision Segment 24). They are described as "medium-income families, age 22-29, with a
relatively large number of children." They "eat at fast food chicken restaurants, smoke menthol cigarettes, and
shop at Lady Foot Locker." A visual review of the photographs for each of the "MicroVision" rankings shows
minorities pictured in eight of the ten worst clusters and in only one of the ten best clusters.(19)
The market segmentation approach has become so easily and widely duplicated that Global MOSAIC by
Experian (the United Kingdom's largest crediting and marketing information firm) now purports to cluster
much of the entire world-- over 779 million consumers in 18 countries. Global MOSAIC divides the world
population into 14 lifestyle types that it says "can be found in every modernized country based on a simple
proposition that the world's cities share common patterns of residential segregation." All 18 nations, according
Experian, "have their ghettos of'Inner City Melting Pot,' suburbs of'Midscale Metro Office Workers' and
communities of 'Educated Cosmopolitans.'"(20) Ethnic stereotypes are common within these classifications.
"Chicano Blues" residents are "very reflective of the Hispanic culture (listen to Spanish radio, buy Latin music,
travel to Mexico and Central and South America) .... [and] rank first for visiting gambling casinos, playing the
lottery, and eating fast food 14 or more times in the last month." "Motowners" are "predominantly young,
Black (77%) renters with low incomes. They rank second for single parent families and total unemployment.
Notable purchases include foods that are directed at children such as powdered soft drinks, bubble gum,
Hostess Twinkies, and Kellogg's Froot Loops."(21)
National advertisers were among the first users of the cluster markets running ads in "zoned" editions of news
and entertainment magazines to target zipcode areas most likely to buy their products. Governments followed
suit. In 1980 the Defense Department contracted with Claritas for help in locating areas where it might fmd
better success in recruiting for the all-volunteer army. Claritas matched zipcode data on three years of Army
recruits with their home address's cluster classification and determined that lower-income Southern and rural
areas (Shotguns & Pickups, Mines & Mills, Blue-Collar Nursery, Coalburg & Corntown) were top recruitment
areas rather than the urban neighborhoods previously targeted. The Army increased the number of recruiting
centers in these cluster areas, set new enlistment quotas based on the findings, and increased advertising in
selected magazines (Field & Stream, Sports Afield, Outdoor Life, Mechanics Illustrated) commonly sold to
residents in the clusters identified. Claritas also analyzed the zipcodes of Americans killed in highway
accidents for the U.S. Department of Transportation to determine where the department should concentrate its
"buckle up" campaigns (Norma Rae-ville and Grain Belt).(22)
"You are where you live" the Claritas motto takes on self-fulfilling prophecy as institutions target customers
based on cluster descriptions. According to Weiss's examples, a West Coast bank used clusters to decide
whether to offer area residents a charge card with $500 or $1,000 credit or no card at all. An East Coast
developer decided where to locate shopping malls and which stores to seek as anchors. A college in Nebraska
sent different recruitment materials inquiring high school students depending upon their zipcode address.
Students from higher- ranking marketing clusters were mailed a brochure on "A Stepping Stone to Your
Future" while students from lower-ranking clusters were sent a brochure on "An Affordable Education." A
college in Maryland assigned roommates based on their zipcode cluster "to reduce conflicts."(23)
Competing Images of City Life
"Tell me someone's zipcode, and I can predict what they eat, drink, drive -- even think," promised Jonathan
Robbin, creator of the first Claritas clustering system.(24) As observed above, marketing companies use
computer programs to crunch decennial census data looking for pockets of homogeneity, the leitmotif of the
advertising world, and then to label neighborhood residents according to pre-packaged cluster stereotypes.
While this approach may work fairly well in some relatively homogeneous rural and suburban areas, city
populations tend to be fur more diverse, with city blocks including people of many backgrounds and lifestyles.
Consider this description of the area along Lincoln Avenue on Milwaukee's near southside, described by
Milwaukee Magazine senior editor Kurt Chandler: "From third-generation Europeans to first-generation
Mexicans to Puerto Ricans, African Americans, American Indians, Hmong, professionals, blue-collar workers,
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gays and straights there has to be more diversity along this street than any other in the city. On the street, a
woman in full leathers rides a Harley down the center line, while a wiry Asian boy kicks a rubber ball along
the sidewalk. Lincoln Village is self-sustaining in many ways, a foreign land a city within a city with a
different set of cultures and traditions, different faces, too rarely known by outsiders."(25)
Log onto Internet sites of international marketing companies and a very different image of this area is given.
CACI Marketing Systems website defines the population as "Low Income: Young & Old." This consumer
type, says CACI, "incorporates the extremes of the age distribution, the very young and the elderly, which is
reflected in their lifestyles: purchases of infant toys, toy cars and trucks, jewelry, and household items such as
flatware and washing machines."(24) The Claritas "MicroVision" model reports that the zipcode area has three
major populations. Exactly "28.80%" of the households are "Close-Knit Families," defined as "low income
young adults, age 18-34 with a large number of children, seven or more people." Another "25.36%" are
labeled "Trying Metro Times," described as "very low income young single adults with young children, age
25-34, and seniors, over 75 years, one to six people." The third group, making up precisely "17.89%" of the
population, is catalogued as "Metro Singles" who are "medium-low income young singles and some couples,
age 25-39, with few children, one to two people." On its website entitled "A Zip Code Can Make Your
Company Lots of Money!" Claritas claims that each of these market segments "consists of households that
have similar demographic characteristics, lifestyles, interests, media habits, and purchasing behaviors."(27)
Others fmd city neighborhoods a bit more complex.
Conclusion
National and international marketing firms currently exert great influence on business decisions in the United
States. The largest firms amass incredible amounts of information on individuals and localities from public
databases (like driver's license and motor vehicle files, postal service route information, federal Medicare files
and federal census files) and from private sources (like loan application data, credit card receipts, medical
histories and warranty card returns). These databases are fed into national modeling programs used to generate
reports for clients in any locality or subpopulation market. Given the mass production nature of the industry,
local residents are not consulted on whether the resulting statistics are accurate for a given neighborhood and
data inconsistencies are often adjusted to fit the model used. As Jonathan Robbin, the founder of Claritas,
envisioned, the data sets are packaged as "expert systems" where the user is not given information on the
research methodology, the data sources used or the age of the data sources.(28) Error rates for the demographic
estimates are not shown, if ever calculated.
The experience in Milwaukee neighborhoods shows that these data reports should be used with caution both
for the accuracy of the information reported and for the stereotypes perpetuated. Increasingly, local agencies
will need to "fact check" the profiles being created to describe their neighborhoods and challenge the
assumptions on which they are based.
The typical market research firm uses a deficit-based model of city neighborhoods overlooking the income
density attributes that could make them attractive to retailers. Retailers who base their decisions on these
deficit models will continue to lose out on valuable economic opportunities. At the same time, central city
residents will be forced to drive longer distances for products they need and miss opportunities for employment
in their neighborhoods. Hopefully, as Milwaukee takes leadership in developing its own marketing data to map
neighborhood assets, the negative influences of international marketing firms can be diminished and the
strengths of central city areas recognized.
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